ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD RESEARCH: INTERPRETING ONE\u27S ENTRANCE INTO THE FIELD AS THROWNNESS by Chughtai, Hameed & Myers, Michael
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ECIS 2014 Proceedings
ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD RESEARCH:
INTERPRETING ONE'S ENTRANCE INTO
THE FIELD AS THROWNNESS
Hameed Chughtai
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, h.chughtai@auckland.ac.nz
Michael Myers
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, m.myers@auckland.ac.nz
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2014
This material is brought to you by the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ECIS 2014 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Hameed Chughtai and Michael Myers, 2014, "ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD RESEARCH: INTERPRETING ONE'S ENTRANCE
INTO THE FIELD AS THROWNNESS", Proceedings of the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) 2014, Tel Aviv,
Israel, June 9-11, 2014, ISBN 978-0-9915567-0-0
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2014/proceedings/track19/4
  
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                        1 
 
 
ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD RESEARCH: INTERPRETING 
ONE’S ENTRANCE INTO THE FIELD AS THROWNNESS 
 Complete Research 
 
Chughtai, Hameed, University of Auckland Business School, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, 
New Zealand. h.chughtai@auckland.ac.nz 
Myers, Michael David, University of Auckland Business School, Private Bag 92019, 
Auckland, New Zealand. m.myers@auckland.ac.nz 
Abstract 
The field is where an ethnographer does the fieldwork, yet a discussion of one’s entrance into the field 
is essentially overlooked in the IS research literature. This paper suggests that entrance into the field 
can be seen as a rite of passage into a practice world. Using phenomenological hermeneutics, we direct 
the focus to everyday being-in-the-world to develop a practical understanding of the field as a fusion of 
horizons where an ethnographer is thrown. The concept of thrownness suggests including one’s 
historicity and prejudices as one enters the field. We provide some empirical evidence from an 
ethnographic field study at a large scale IT services organization. This paper is intended as a 
contribution to the discussion about qualitative research methods in information systems. 
Keywords: Philosophy of IS, Qualitative Research Methods, Ethnography, Fieldwork, Hermeneutics. 
1 Introduction 
Ethnographic research in Information Systems (IS) is often used in critical and interpretive studies of 
social, organizational and technological phenomena (e.g., Bell et al., 2005; Harvey and Myers, 1995; 
Myers and Young, 1997; Lee and Myers, 2004). It is an anthropological method with strong 
philosophical and theoretical foundations (e.g., Geertz, 1973, 2000). The ethnographic corpus in IS 
research contains significant theoretical and practical contributions (Dourish and Bell, 2007; Klein and 
Myers, 1999; Myers and Newman, 2007; Schultze, 2000). However, a discussion of how a researcher 
enters and exits the field is missing from the IS research literature. This paper critically discusses 
entrance into the field and suggests that it can be seen as a rite of passage into a practice world where 
the ethnographer finds himself or herself.  
An ethnographer who enters the field attempts to learn new practices and their meanings in the field by 
encountering the phenomena (Myers, 1999). In a sense, an ethnographer is like a child in a new culture 
learning via worldly encounters (e.g., Van Maanen, 2011b, p. 220; 2011a, p. 75). Over time the 
ethnographer attempts to develop “an intimate familiarity with the dilemmas, frustrations, routines, 
relationships, and risks that are part of everyday life” (Myers, 1999, p. 5). Accordingly, in this paper, 
we attempt to develop a practice oriented interpretation of entering the field by using the being-in-the-
world analysis of Heidegger (2008); in this way, we acknowledge both the ethnographer and the 
participant’s everyday practices. 
We understand an ethnographer’s entrance as being thrown into a world where one makes sense of it 
using one’s historical position across space and time, and amidst already existing structures, things and 
practices (Heidegger, 2011, p. 26; cf. Schatzki, 2006, p. 171; Van Maanen, 2011a). The concept of 
thrownness is focal to interpret a phenomenon insofar as “what we are is,” Heidegger (2008, p. 26) 
explicates, “how we are” in a practical situation where we encounter the phenomenon. Further, he points 
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out that we always already have a ‘horizon of understanding’ simply by virtue of our being in the world; 
we interpret and understand the world from this horizon (Heidegger, 2008, p. 36ff). Such horizons 
include, but are not limited to, our historicity, temporality, spatiality, everyday language and 
presuppositions of the phenomena (Gadamer, 1989). From these horizons we make sense of the 
situations we find ourselves in during our everyday practices. The central thesis of this paper, building 
on phenomenological hermeneutics, is to provide an interpretive understanding of an ethnographer’s 
entrance in the field and how it can be theorized, grounded in everyday practices. We illustrate it through 
the concept of thrownness using field evidence from a critical ethnography at a large scale IT services 
organization in New Zealand. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We first discuss the need for theorization of entrance into the 
field by taking a cue from ethnographic literature and relating it to a rite of passage. We then present 
and unpack the relevant hermeneutic principles to lay the groundwork for our interpretation. Next, we 
present the concept in terms of thrownness followed by some empirical evidence from the field. The 
final section is the conclusion and discusses some avenues for further research. 
2 Entering the Field 
The concept of the field is basic to all forms of ethnographic research, yet the idea of the field is often 
taken for granted. The field is often seen as simply being out there, waiting to be discovered. Entrance 
to the field is thus seen as being rather trivial, a mere stepping stone to gain access to a venue instead of 
as a rite of passage into a practice world (cf. Rabinow, 2007). If seen as the latter, however, one’s 
entrance into the field can determine an ethnographer’s position within the circle of understanding in 
the field, where one fits and finds oneself in the existing everyday world of the participants (e.g., 
Rabinow, 2007; Geertz, 1973). Thus, both entrance in to and exit from the field are significant from a 
theoretical as well as a practical point of view (cf. Michailova et al., 2013). 
The field is the home of the phenomena and in the words of Dreyfus (1991, p. 162): “we can only 
describe the phenomena as they show themselves and show how they fit with the rest of human 
existence.” The entrance is, thus, an encounter insofar as the field can be seen as a practice world (Van 
Maanen, 2011a; cf. Heidegger, 2011, p. 210ff) where the participants are already entwined in a nexus 
of historical practices (Schatzki, 2010). The ethnographer encounters, lives through, and makes sense 
of this world via everyday activities. Encountering the field, then, is a historical event; it is a rite of 
passage into a world. 
Upon entrance, one needs to develop an intimate familiarity with the activities of the natives in which 
they are deeply absorbed in their daily lives (cf. Geertz, 1973, p. 432ff). Such an enterprise calls for 
absorbing oneself in the field and involves skilful coping in the everyday practices in the field (Dreyfus, 
1991, p. 60ff). In this way, gradually the ethnographer’s comprehension of the field phenomena becomes 
automatic and his or her responses transparent in practice. Thus, an ethnographer steadily becomes one 
with the world of participants and the activities become intelligible; and by engaging in the field 
practices, the ethnographer finds her place in the holistic whole of the field. As this transparency is 
achieved in practice, the field becomes a world where one belongs, where everything makes sense 
simply by virtue of being there in the field (Geertz, 2000, p. 69; cf. Van Maanen, 2011a). This is the 
heart of the hermeneutic of entrance into the field. 
While we acknowledge that there might be other points of departure if we extend the hermeneutics of 
the field to the “social field” (Bourdieu, 1985), we restrict our theorizing to this study’s philosophical 
position of critical phenomenological hermeneutics. Next, we problematize the concept of the field by 
mapping it to the hermeneutic circle (see, Klein and Myers, 1999, p. 71) in order to reveal the subtleties 
of the entrance. 
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2.1 The Field as a Hermeneutic Circle 
Central to hermeneutics is the concept of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle concerns the 
“dialectic between the understanding of the text as a whole and the interpretation of its parts, in which 
descriptions are guided by anticipated explanations” (Myers, 2004, p. 107). According to this dialectic 
view, we always find ourselves in a practical situation where our sense-making of a current phenomenon 
pivots on our apposite prior experiences, pre-understandings and presuppositions (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
268ff; Heidegger, 2008, p. 188ff). 
Accordingly, Geertz (2000, p. 5ff) relates the idea of the hermeneutic circle to the field enquiry in terms 
of developing a practical understanding of the field phenomena. For example, if we are studying a 
particular culture, upon the entrance, the part (e.g., sacred symbol) can only be understood in the context 
of the whole (e.g., a culture, a belief system). Similarly, when a fieldworker enters the field, he or she 
might not be aware of the whole context, and thus has to try to grasp its practical logic (cf. Van Maanen, 
2011a, p. 220). In a sense, field researchers are in a hermeneutic circle (cf. Schultze, 2000, p. 25ff) as 
they continually engage in an interpretation between their self–understanding and their understanding 
of the world (the field) viz. the field where they find themselves thrown. In this sense, acknowledging 
Geertz (2000), we can say all interpretations of the field need to begin by taking a view that one is 
already absorbed in the practices of the field; as Dreyfus (1991, p. 4) points out “one must always do 
hermeneutics from within a hermeneutic circle.” 
We now make the logic of the fieldwork explicit by applying the concept of the hermeneutic circle to 
the field. This is what ethnographers usually take for granted. 
2.2 The Structure of Understanding in a Hermeneutic Circle 
As discussed earlier, the hermeneutic circle can be seen as a dialectic of many horizons of understanding. 
In this dialectic, Heidegger (2008, p. 191ff) points to a trinity of minute horizons within every 
interpretation which he refers to as fore-structure that consists of, 
i) fore-having (taken for granted background);  
ii) fore-sight (assumptions concerning the interpretation); and, 
iii) fore-conception (expectations; something we already grasp). 
The hermeneutic circle, thus, spells out the significance of our presuppositions. While fore-having can 
be understood as the ethnographer’s previous understandings and preconceptions about the field site, 
fore-sight is the horizon from where one observes and participates in the site e.g., researcher, participant, 
etc. – from one horizon, we observe another one. Together with them, it’s our fore-conception which is 
what enables us to make sense of the phenomena in the field in terms of our familiar understanding or 
expectations. The historicity, thus, plays a crucial role in our everyday sense making. In this way, before 
one develops a practical understanding, it is essential to grasp the phenomenon appropriately; thus, 
Heidegger (2008, p. 195) puts emphasis on one’s entrance into the hermeneutic circle: 
“What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way…. To be sure, 
we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood 
that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-
conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the 
scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.” 
Hence, Heidegger stresses, all understandings are connected in a series of fore-structures – including 
one’s historicity – that cannot be eliminated (Ibid.) insofar as we cannot truly set aside our prior 
knowledge before interpreting a phenomenon. The ethnographer, then, needs to become as aware as 
possible and account for these interpretive influences in their entrance to the field. In this way, fore-
having, fore-sight and fore-conception or presuppositions serve as the foundation for understanding the 
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field phenomena. We can say that the authenticity of the interpretation of any observation hinges on an 
ethnographer’s becoming aware of and transparently interacting with the phenomenon in the field; thus, 
a concrete understanding enables an ethnographer to go deep into participants’ practice worlds. 
Accordingly, developing the understanding further, Dreyfus (1991, p. 199) explicates the significance 
of the fore-structure in an interpretation and redirects our attention to the circular relationship caused by 
our expectations (fore-conception) when interpreting a phenomenon: an interpretation occurs on a 
backdrop of assumptions in which the latter itself is conditioned upon the former through understanding 
(Fig 1). 
 
Figure 1. Fore-structure’s Circular Relationship 
The circular relationship shows that we understand every situation we encounter from the perspectives 
of our historical and experiential understandings. Thus, as we develop understanding by interpreting a 
situation and, by doing so and in which, our everyday understandings underpin the very assumptions 
concerning the phenomenon. We cannot truly set aside our presuppositions; any new understanding 
mediates through our historicity. In this way, Gadamer (1989, p. 271-3, 305) points out, our many 
horizons of understanding within the fore-structure seamlessly work or ‘fuse’ with each other; one such 
example is his enrichment of the idea of fore-conception in terms of horizon of prejudice, which is 
discussed next. 
2.3 The Role of Prejudice in the Hermeneutic Circle 
In hermeneutic philosophy, prejudices are not necessarily bad. According to Gadamer (1989, p. 269ff), 
a good prejudice is our prior awareness of the historicity of meaning, of where we are coming from; so, 
prejudice actually assists us in constructive interpretation (cf. Myers, 2004). Indeed, without prejudices 
(i.e., our pre-understanding), we could not develop new understandings about anything appropriately. 
Bad prejudice, however, is when we leap to a conclusion, ignoring any evidence that might contradict 
our pre-understanding. Gadamer (1989, p. 268–9) explains what it means to be open to new meanings 
and understandings: 
“All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text. But this 
openness always includes our situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own 
meanings or ourselves in relation to it … This kind of sensitivity involves neither “neutrality” 
with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and appropriation 
of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s own 
bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against 
one’s own fore-meanings.” 
Interpretation
Understanding
Assumptions
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Hence we can say that the field is a world of understanding which we can interpret as the hermeneutic 
circle of an intricate practice world. The ethnographer finds herself thrown in this world, demarcated by 
prejudices; but understanding it as thrownness, in essence, enables her to interpret the field against many 
horizons of understandings. 
3 Entrance as Thrownness  
The field is a complex world where ethnography occurs and ethnographer finds herself (Van Maanen, 
2011b; Rabinow, 2003; Geertz, 1973). In this way, one’s entrance into the field is a historical event in 
space and time. In the words of Heidegger (2011, p. 26, 44) we could define it as “the state one finds 
oneself in” as the thrownness of ourselves into a situation. In this way, as discussed earlier, the entrance 
is grounded in historicity as well as prejudices and entwined with participant’s practices; thus, it enables 
us to respond and make sense of the field as a practice world (Heidegger, 2008, p. 219-224). The concept 
of thrownness further suggests the authenticity of an ethnographer hinges on doing the activities in the 
field insofar as “‘one is’ what one does,” explicates Heidegger (2008, p. 283); ethnography essentially 
pivots on doing the fieldwork. Thus, we can say, the field is not just where one finds oneself but also 
how one finds it; the latter is delimited by our thrownness which requires engaging in the fieldwork by 
actually doing the activities as the participants do. In this manner, the thrownness perspective provides 
a tangible practical anchor for ethnographers to make sense of the field. This point is crucial for any 
fieldwork as it acknowledges, without distancing oneself, the significance of the practices in the field 
where the ethnographer is thrown (Klein and Myers, 1999, p. 74; cf. Van Maanen, 2011a); thus, it allows 
an ethnographer to be intimately involved with the participants’ practices in the field instead of 
becoming a mere spectator of them. 
3.1 Being Thrown in the Field  
For ethnographers, “finding [their] feet,” as Geertz (1973, p. 13) points out, is a “personal experience” 
in which they are engaged after being thrown in the field. We are thrown in an unfamiliar terrain where 
we must find a firm place to stand on. But how do we start? And insofar as thrownness is a practice, 
where does this begin? The answer lies in the practical logic of practices insofar as, for Heidegger (2008, 
p. 458ff), we are thrown and find the world already there before us. Thus, in our everyday practices, by 
the virtue of our being-in-the-world, we are already in the world involved (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011, 
p. 350; cf. Schatzki, 2010); in other words, we are always already in a throw. We are thrown from one 
practice world to another. In this thrownness, it is our horizons of understanding which, as shown earlier, 
help us make sense of the field. 
We encounter the field from our preconceptions namely, our prejudice horizon. However, we are thrown 
not just in an environment, or a practice world, but also in a historical moment; thus our prejudice 
horizon is fused with historicity of the field. So, on entrance, we only have a factical understanding of 
the field. It is important to observe the difference between factual and factical: the latter is our ways to 
be (researcher, mother, etc.) whereas the former is its properties (male, female). Dreyfus (1991, p. 20-
5) explicates that we can never be sure of our factical ways of understanding. Accordingly, in 
thrownness, our factical understanding of ourselves is bound with others’ factical understanding of the 
field – a nexus of practices, equipment and entities – which we encounter (cf. Klein and Myers, 1999, 
p. 74): our interpretation of phenomena in the field is their interpretation and vice versa. Heidegger 
(2008, p. 400) explains, 
“[We get] dragged along in thrownness; that is to say, as something which has been thrown into 
the world, it loses itself in the “world” in its factical submission to that with which it is to 
concern itself.” 
Haar (1993) develops it further and points out that our standard response to this throw is to get busy and 
engage ourselves in activities with one another. That is to say, we flee from anxiety by seeking shelter 
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in mundane practices as Dreyfus (1991, p. 236) points out: we are thrown straight into the mundane 
affairs of the field where the factical interpretation of practices matters more than a conceptual 
understanding. Accordingly, Ciborra and Willcocks (2006, p. 135) also discuss thrownness in term of 
facticity and raise the significance of practices; they say the “concern for factical life expresses the re-
balancing of activities,” that is to reaffirm that mundane understanding takes precedence in the field. 
We can then say that it is our thrownness that constructs the meaning out of interaction with participants, 
equipment and situations, in the field, since these things matter to us. Similarly, when we find ourselves 
thrown in a practice world which requires engagement with equipment, the standard response is, almost 
always, to follow an establish practice such as organizational norms before making sense of it and using 
it transparently (cf. Heidegger, 2008, p. 190). Accordingly, Geertz (1973, p. 12) complements 
Heidegger’s interpretation and provides a practical explication concerning making sense of everyday 
practices in the field: 
“To play the violin it is necessary to possess certain skills, habits, knowledge, and talents, to be 
in the mood to play, and (as the old joke goes) to have a violin. But violin playing is neither the 
habits, skills, knowledge, and so on, nor the mood, nor (the notion believers in “material culture” 
apparently embrace) the violin.” 
Geertz stresses the need to understand the significance of entwined background practices, which are 
otherwise invisible to the ethnographers and generally associated as customs or rituals with a practice, 
instead of objectively embracing a phenomenon in the field (Ibid.). Thus, upon encountering an 
unfamiliar practice, the ethnographer is required to take a holistic view where the practice belongs before 
interpreting it. Such ‘nexuses’ of practice contains many things, purposes, norms and other sets of 
practices which go along with a given practice (Schatzki, 2010). In thrownness, the participant 
observation, thus, is not “at them” as Boland (1985, p. 343) argues, but “with them.” He continues that 
in this way the “understanding comes step by step, layer by layer, as preconceptions, prejudices, and 
assumptions are recognized and seen through” (Ibid). Klein and Myers (1999, p. 74) go one step further 
and elevate the participants’ status to researchers as interpreters as well as analysts insofar as “they alter 
their horizons by the appropriation of concepts used by [ethnographers] interacting with them, and they 
are analysts in so far as their actions are altered by their changed horizons.” 
Hence, we find ourselves thrown in a field amidst an intricate nexuses of practices of the participants 
and equipment; in thrownness, the horizons of understandings of both the ethnographers and the 
participants are entwined in the field. Next, we present evidence of our interpretation from a critical 
ethnography which illustrate how entrance to the field can be empirically theorized as thrownness in a 
practice world. 
4 Research Method 
We used critical ethnography (Klein and Myers, 1999; Myers, 1997) to investigate one’s entrance into 
the ethnographic field. The site of the ethnography was a large scale organization in New Zealand, from 
here onwards called NZOrg, where the initial contact was made in July 2013. Soon afterward, the first 
author joined NZorg’s IT department as a software engineer to work part-time on a critical on-going 
project. Being an active project member at the coalface of organization meant that full access was 
granted to the organization’s IT systems and IT staff. An additional IT infrastructural access was given 
simply by the virtue of being an engineer working on the project core which required higher access and 
permissions to interact with intra team human and digital resources. 
Participant observation was the main source of data. The daily field notes include “thick descriptions” 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 3-30) of the events and practices in the field. The field notes also include notes of 
weekly meetings, informal chats, audio notes, personal logs and official electronic records (project 
communications, video-conferencing, instant messaging, emails, and photographs). The researcher also 
participated in two different recurring user groups’ meetings. In addition to the aforesaid sources, three 
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semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted (Myers and Newman, 2007). The interviews were 
candid and confessional in nature and lasted between an hour and an hour and half. All interviews were 
digitally recorded and transcribed by the authors themselves. All field notes and interview data were 
coded immediately. The data was interpreted using hermeneutic analysis (Myers, 2004) and adhering to 
the principles of interpretive fieldwork (Klein and Myers, 1999). Collectively, the evidence for this 
article comprises 270 hours of observational data, collected over 36 field visits, most of which pertains 
to the entrance phase of the fieldwork. 
5 Evidence of Thrownness in the Field 
As discussed earlier, there are many horizons in the field which determine thrownness. Some of the 
examples are everyday language, historicity, prejudice, temporality and spatiality. Here, we present the 
evidence for just two horizons namely, historicity and prejudice, which we hope illustrate how an 
ethnographer’s entrance can be seen as being thrown in the ethnographic field. 
5.1 Horizon 1: Historicity 
We first discuss the historicity of the researcher. In our case the ethnographer in this research project (a 
doctoral researcher) is also a seasoned programmer and has worked internationally in the corporate 
sector. During the initial contact with NZorg it was evident that the technical skills of the ethnographer 
were in line with workplace IT practices. Likewise, the long term research project objectives (i.e., 
studying of technological practices in organizations) was also consistent with NZorg’s strategy. Thus, 
the ethnographer was thrown in a somewhat familiar world and had some good pre-understanding of the 
horizon. In line with the hermeneutic of thrownness, the entrance in the field and integrating into the 
team became mostly transparent as the field notes from the first day reflect: 
[one of the managers] commented on my query on the team’s working hours: “You know how 
they [developers] work...come on, you are one of us, you should know [laughs].” (Excerpt from 
the field notes) 
Being a researcher in an unfamiliar organization with a different culture can be challenging. But in this 
case, the ethnographer was described as ‘one of us’ on the very first day of fieldwork, ostensibly because 
of prior work experience. Being called ‘one of us’ also meant that it was relatively easy to get intimately 
in touch with the horizons of participants. This point manifests itself in the candid and confessional 
nature of many informal chats and interviews. Consider the first encounter with a young programmer: 
In my first coffee area talk, I was asked: “You are a programmer?” I saw her eyes widen with 
curiosity. I replied yes; but when I started to give my background, I was promptly and 
continuously interrupted: “Which [programming] languages?”… “Which [software 
development] framework?” She completely ignored the fact that I was introduced as a 
researcher just a day ago. […] Her curiosity increased, as I provided details, and was topped by 
a geeky compliment: “Ooh, C++ [programming language], very hard-core,” she smiled, almost 
turning into a giggle.  
[Later] when I inquired her about…other team members, to my amazement I was told: “oh, 
you’ll like them; they are like us, you know, programmers!” (Excerpt from the informal chats) 
What is interesting is the seemingly immediate change of perception of the ethnographer, from being a 
complete stranger doing research to someone who is included in the phrase “they are like us”. Of course, 
this could be just a simple matter of luck or courtesy. But it does seem to indicate a fusion of horizons, 
that is, the historicity of participants, in this case software development that is grounded in practices, 
which establishes the dialog. Although the role as researcher was clearly mentioned in the official 
introduction to the team, the young programmer didn’t worry about it and from then on treated the 
researcher as a fellow software engineer (since the researcher was working part-time as one as well). 
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This point later became vivid as none of the other programmers brought up the subject of research but 
they seemed more interested in knowing about the researcher’s computer science background instead of 
the research purpose. We can say the horizon of historicity persists in the participants’ perspective. 
Further, the historicity facilitated a prompt integration into the team as ‘one of us’ and paved the way 
toward engaged participation.  
Thus, using historicity in thrownness, we can say that the ethnographer in this case quickly found his 
feet, but this was only because of the shared background practices. Hence, we suggest that without 
finding a tangible hinge between participant and researcher’s histories, it could be much more difficult 
to achieve a transparent symmetry in thrownness; and consequently, less chances of transparent fusion 
of horizons.  
Accordingly, the historicity determines the thrownness and is based on the fore-structure of this horizon 
(Table 1). The fore-structure is interpreted as follows: from this horizon, the participants belong to 
DevTeam and thus it is their given background (fore-having) in the field; while the researcher joined 
the organization and DevTeam is only one of the many departments (parts) in the organization (whole). 
Next, the expectations (fore-conceptions) of participants are driven by their actual work roles (fore-
sight); thus their familiarity is local to their tasks. On the other hand, the researcher has a long work 
history and his role is not strictly bound to NZOrg; thus, the familiarity is historical. 
 
 fore-having fore-sight fore-conception 
Participants Project Team 
 
e.g., DevTeam 
Work roles 
 
programmers, managers 
Local familiarity 
 
e.g., coding practices 
Researcher Organization 
 
NZOrg 
Ethnographer 
 
team member, software engineer 
Historical familiarity 
 
corporate IT experience 
Table 1. Fore-structure of Horizon: Historicity 
By spelling out the components of the fore-structure of the horizon of historicity we observe how a 
researcher’s engagement with participants in the field is grounded deeply in the historicity of everyday 
practices. Further, it shows how the field is entwined with the practices of both researcher and the 
participants. It is, then, the dialectic within this horizon that enables understanding as a researcher 
engages in the fieldwork. In this way, the subtle complexities of practical engagement with fieldwork 
come to fore and become available for further enquiry and interpretation. 
Hence, acknowledging the historicity of interpretations shows that the pre-understandings of the 
participants and researchers are part of an on-going dialectic. Next, we explain the pre-understandings 
further using the evidence concerning the horizon of prejudice. 
5.2 Horizon 2: Prejudice 
As a working member of DevTeam, the researcher was asked to shadow and then to proceed to manage 
an on-going technological change. This was simply due to an unforeseen human resource issue. 
However, this task assignment is a practical example of a ‘good prejudice’ insofar as the managers had 
a positive pre-understanding of researcher’s skills. Part of the work required the ethnographer to attend 
meetings with technology stakeholders from other involved teams (in this case, ITeam). In one such 
meeting, there was a brief discussion about what advice the ethnographer might be able to give, to 
counter arguments from ITeam. Again, we observe from the horizon of prejudice insofar as it manifests 
itself out of researcher’s current role which in turn is grounded in related practical experience (horizon 
of historicity); thus we observe how subtly the two horizons fuse transparently in practice. Consider this 
excerpt from the follow up meeting with the manager which occurred soon after the intradepartmental 
meeting: 
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[the manager] said that he is really glad that finally “a real dialog” has started between DevTeam 
and other teams [e.g., ITeam]. When I asked him to unpack what he means, he explained that 
sometimes developers are so quiet in saying their mind, “they’ll ignore everything as long as 
their code is compiling.” He continued that in such situations it is impossible to let others know 
what their point of view is…since no one says ‘what the problem is’. He then thanked me 
politely and said that he really needs “someone who knows the developers perspective, someone 
who speaks for the developers.” (Excerpt from the meeting notes) 
Toward the end of the meeting, the same subject came to the fore again as the manager disclosed, 
…referring to the argument with ITeam [he says] it’s good to have “this debate” and how “no 
one dares says anything, no one says their point of view,” [and] that after such discussions, only 
then, “we can find a ‘common ground’ which will help us building better IT systems.” 
…When I was about to leave, he revealed that “Jim is the quiet one, I know his personality, 
that's why I put you with him so you have to do a lot of talking,” I told him that I understand 
and will make sure we are all on the same page all the time, he nodded back and I moved back 
to my desk. (Excerpt from the meeting notes) 
Again, on first glance it seems a matter of workplace openness. However, applying the thrownness lens, 
we see the ethnographer is thrown in the world a) against the horizon of prejudice and b) the prejudice 
reveals others’ (participant) position in the horizon. That is, first, the prejudice discloses the work habits 
of the participants, which is not a negative thing but simply their absorption in practices. Along the same 
lines, the researcher’s counsel is sought, by the virtue of good prejudice (from our point of view), as it 
is grounded in rituals concerning standard technology practices which are otherwise overlooked in 
developers’ everyday technological habits. For instance, the ethnographer is familiar with software 
practices’ rules and regulations which the developers usually take for granted as they are immersed in 
their work. Thus, the prejudice laden decision of a manager led to a larger fusion of horizons, that is, 
intra-team dialog. 
Further, we can understand the intricacies of prejudice succinctly by spelling out the fore-structure of 
this horizon, documented in Table 2. Note that the fore-structure of participants is highly contextualized 
to their team, which is the practice world where they belong. Examples of practices include following 
workplace norms (fore-sight), using IT within the team (fore-having), and IT use adhering to the 
milestones of the team’s project work (fore-conception). On the other hand, the ethnographer is thrown 
in a field as a whole thus the fore-structure is seen holistically and historically. In this way, the local 
horizons of participants fuse with holistic horizon of the ethnographer, and both are driven by their 
corresponding prejudices. 
 
 fore-having fore-sight fore-conception 
Participants Equipment 
 
e.g., DevTeam IT 
Habitual 
 
e.g., workplace norms 
Use 
 
e.g., project work 
Researcher Equipment 
 
NZOrg IT 
Ritual 
 
programming practices 
Purpose 
 
organizational ethnography 
Table 2. Fore-structure of Horizon: Prejudice 
Consistent with the concept of thrownness, the intricacies of the fore-structure of the horizons of 
understanding presented here suggest that a) there is indeed a dialectical relationship which the 
ethnographer encounters upon entrance and b) in order to interpret the dialectic, both the researcher’s 
and participants’ perspectives need to be taken into account. Next, we interpret our evidence in the 
broader context of the fieldwork to highlight theoretical contributions and practical significance. 
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6 Discussion 
In an ethnography, the researcher is the instrument to be calibrated. The ethnographer is the primary 
data collection device (Myers, 2013, p. 139, 187; Conquergood, 1991, p. 180). Our contribution thus 
deals with the first logical step in ethnographic research namely, instrument calibration. We have 
demonstrated, first and foremost, before studying the “others,” the researcher must study herself. Also, 
for theorizing entrance, the evidence may be of a confessional nature, but not its interpretation. This is 
to say, the entrance as thrownness reveals the teleology of the field practices by avoiding the temptation 
to simply document a series of personal experiences, which may sway towards ‘bad prejudice’. Hence, 
we highlight the problem in what we might call two extremes about fieldwork: one extreme being that 
the ethnographer is simply documenting in an objective manner the field “out there,” the other extreme 
being that the field is seen from the researcher’s eyes only, in which case there is a danger that the 
ethnographer’s prejudices may rein in a tyrannical fashion. 
Further, we suggest that the concept of thrownness can potentially aid, not just as a theoretical tool, but 
also in interpreting and analysing qualitative interviews and observations. Employing the idea of the 
hermeneutic circle paves the way to practically incorporate metaphor and narrative (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 
36; cf. Ricœur, 1991) as modes of analyses in the later stages of ethnographic research. 
Using a thrownness lens, by understanding and acknowledging one’s own prejudices, the ethnographer 
can set herself free from anxiety and critically understand other horizons in the field. We have 
demonstrated, by fusing the horizons of understanding, that the mundane and teleological nature of 
practices comes to the fore, upon entrance, and these become available for interpretation. Also, 
acknowledging historicity enables the researcher to do the fieldwork along with the participants in the 
practice world instead of, as Miettinen et al. (2009, p. 1315) put, becoming a ‘mere observant’ of 
practices.  
Another advantage of invoking hermeneutics of thrownness is that it enables the ethnographer, upon 
entering the field as hermeneutic circle, to track anomalies by:  
i) moving away from the literal meaning of phenomena, 
ii) setting the primary focus on the interpretation prior to the explanation, 
iii) deferring judgement until interpretation is clear and, 
iv) opening up avenues for further analysis. 
Therefore, new paths emerge during interpretation and can be pursued as needed. The emergent 
approach thus also corrects potential structural issues such as navigating via a fixed blueprint of the field 
that could result in an impasse. For instance, assuming some prior knowledge about the field and then 
working systematically and rather rigidly on that knowledge could easily result in unforeseen 
circumstances and threat the richness of the ethnographic data obtained. Accordingly, to study a social 
phenomenon, such as the everyday practices vis-à-vis technology and organizations, a hermeneutical 
project is required rather than a fixed grand plan. It is virtually impossible to fabricate a blue print that 
will handle every contingency. There are always exceptions and anomalies that might not come under 
the radar (Dreyfus, 1996, p. 7; Kuhn, 2012, p. 52ff). The cyclic nature of hermeneutic circle, therefore, 
addresses such discrepancies by constant interpretations and reinterpretations of the field and the 
fieldwork; thus, thrownness allows the possibility of smooth entrance into the field by letting 
ethnographers find their feet.  
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7 Conclusion 
In this study we have attempted to direct some attention to the theoretical and practical significance of 
entrance into the field; we have taken a step toward putting ‘the field’ as being an important 
consideration in ethnographic fieldwork. We have demonstrated that, before the ethnographer enters the 
field, it is crucial to develop some understanding of the world where she is to be thrown. Myers (2013, 
p. 145ff), for instance, points to the subtleties that one may need to learn new languages, customs, and 
even the dress code according to the field; thus, to gain a critical familiarity with the practices in the 
field is a crucial step in ethnographic fieldwork. Understanding entrance as thrownness suggests and 
allows an ethnographer to know the field intimately as a practice world to be immersed in; it is not 
simply ‘looking’ but knowing ‘before you leap’ – or rather, knowing that you are being ‘thrown’ into 
the field.  
8 Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge some limitations of our study. One limitation is that our findings are from a single 
period of fieldwork in one ethnographic research project only. Also, there was only one researcher on-
site. However, we believe our findings may be applicable to ethnographic fieldwork in other settings. 
Also, we believe it will be possible to apply and extend our work to other ethnographies in future studies. 
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